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Abstract: This paper examines historical methodology and suggests 
ways accounting history may be made more relevant to contempo-
rary accounting researchers. First there is a brief discussion of the 
"traditional" accounting history method, the documentary model, 
and an examination of history methodologies that offer alternatives 
modes of inquiry. This includes the pattern model and rhetorical 
analysis. This discussion is brief and focused on only issues examined 
in subsequent discussion of the empirical research. The discussion of 
the empirical research, including behavioral research, focuses on 
three issues: retrodiction, with examples concerning securities legis-
lation; belief transference, with examples concerning the demand for 
auditing; and methodological transference, with examples from the 
behavioral literature including a discussion of the importance of his-
torical context and sensitivity. The objectives are [1] to show how all 
researchers need to tell more plausible stories and how historical 
analyses can clarify and enhance understanding of the complex envi-
ronment in which accountants function, [2] to suggest fruitful areas 
for future accounting historical/empirical/behavioral research and [3] 
to issue a call for diversity, tolerance, and a free exchange of ideas— 
stressing these as values that cannot be separated from accountants' 
research activity. 
Ball and Foster's [1982] methodological review of empirical 
research highlights the difficult tradeoffs that empirical re-
searchers face when attempting to integrate the institutional en-
vironment of accounting with the constraints imposed by ab-
stract models borrowed from economics, psychology, statistics, 
and mathematics. Ball and Foster address validity issues and 
offer several explanations, such as competing world views, as to 
why this body of research has been less than convincing, con-
cluding that one reason may be that accounting empiricists do 
not tell "plausible" stories.1 Since, as Williams [1992] points out, 
1Ball and Foster [1982] address four validity issues—internal, construct, 
statistical conclusion, and external validity—associated with quasi-experimental 
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accounting empiricists rarely test theories, they use theories to 
shape empirics into coherent stories, the failure to tell plausible 
stories is a fundamental failure. 
Accounting historians could contribute meaningfully to the 
ongoing empirical debate. If understanding precedes interpreta-
tion in any explanatory research project, then historical analy-
ses of topics of interest to empiricists, as well as historical cri-
tiques of empirical models, would be useful contributions to the 
accounting literature. This paper calls for more historical in-
quiries to address issues raised in the empirical research, al-
though we do not imply that accounting historians have not 
addressed these issues, that is not the case.2 However, given the 
enormous resources that have been expended within the aca-
demic community on empirical research over the last three de-
cades, the inconclusive results should be of concern to all ac-
counting academicians. Our overall objective is to stimulate a 
dialogue among accounting academicians, particularly between 
historians and empiricists and between traditional and critical 
accounting historians. 
To enable readers to position this paper, the terms—tradi-
tional and critical—historical research are defined.3 The term 
traditional refers to historical inquiries that attempt to render 
the past familiar, the term, critical, refers to those inquiries that 
try to render the familiar, unfamiliar. These two types of re-
search are complementary, although they often result in con-
flicting interpretations of the historical record. Traditional in-
design and six world views—the six world views are the Accounting Model View 
[matching, cost allocation], Economic Reality View [true income theory], Fair 
Presentation/Comparability View, Economic Consequences/Firm's Stockholders 
View, Economic Consequences to Management View, and Regulatory Compli-
ance View. 
2Positive research is one area that has generated a great deal of historical 
attention, see for example, Tinker, et. al. [1982], Mills [1988], Mouck [1989], to 
name a few, who have pointed out the limitations of this body of research. See 
Mouck [1992] for an interesting rhetorical analysis of why positive research has 
been successful and for discussion of dismissal of criticisms, which could be 
predicted, given the rhetoric of positivism. 
3The authors accept Ball and Foster's [1992] characterization of the re-
search they examine as empirical, recognizing that some taxonomies would 
limit that term to experimental research and label this body of work archival 
[See Buckley, et. al., 1976]. Since the empirical usage is common in accounting, 
that label is retained since many readers will associate this term with research 
that lays claim to scientific status, an important attribute in subsequent discus-
sions. 
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quiries attempt to examine the past on its own terms; the objec-
tive is to gain an empathetic understanding of why people be-
haved as they did in a particular circumstance.4 Critical inquir-
ies focus on how discursive practices or dominant institutions 
have served as filters that enable powerful interests in a society 
to control others without their knowledge; the objective is to 
bring to light the negative and silent aspects of a discipline or 
society. 
This examination of the explanations offered by accounting 
empiricists will be traditional in that the fundamental premise 
of economic rationality that underpins accounting empirical re-
search, perhaps the most potent discursive filter in contempo-
rary society, is not challenged. The purpose is to show why, 
even if one examines empiricism on its own terms, the stories 
that empiricists tell do not always appear plausible. While a 
critical historical analysis of empirical research is not con-
ducted, to the extent possible, we suggest the questions that 
critical researchers might ask are indicated. Also included is a 
brief discussion of the rhetoric of reason to highlight the more 
fundamental challenge that a critical perspective would engen-
der with respect to empirical accounting research. 
The above analysis is presented because it is important to 
establish a meaningful dialogue between traditional and critical 
accounting historians. Kuhn's [1970] conclusion that advances 
in science do not occur through incremental advances within a 
dominant paradigm, but through sharp breaks with that para-
digm, certainly gave impetus to critical work in all disciplines. 
Accounting has been no exception. By examining how account-
ing discourses and its calculative techniques serve the dominant 
economic interests in a society, support class structures, and 
mask societal conflicts, critical accounting histories have high-
lighted the complex, interactive, and constitutive nature of the 
discipline.5 Critical researchers have rendered the familiar, 
4It is not suggested that reenactment is possible; see Martin [1977] for dis-
cus s ion of e m p a t h e t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g and why mos t h i s to r i ans reject 
Collingwood's reenactment model. LaCapra [1985] takes a similar position 
when he writes that a good starting strategy for examining a document is to 
pretend that the author can talk back and to listen to the argument being pre-
sented. 
5See Klamer [1989] for discussion of these attributes of critical research; 
accounting critical research has bee informed by a number of different perspec-
tives, for hermeneut ica l inquiries (i.e., often called interpret ive inquiry, 
hermeneutics rejects the idea that there is an a historical, objective truth that 
3
Merino and Mayper: Accounting history and empirical research
Published by eGrove, 1993
240 The Accounting Historians Journal, December 1993 
strange and in doing so have raised a myriad of interesting 
questions for accounting historians. This essay is traditional in 
that the objective is to examine how accountants have arrived at 
their current state of knowledge. 
Outline of the Paper 
Our discussion starts with a brief overview of the documen-
tary model, explaining why we do not accept the "extreme" form 
of that model, as reflective of "traditional" accounting history. 
Discussed are some aspects of the model that do have wide-
spread acceptance among traditional accounting historians and 
the problems associated with the implicit directionality of the 
model. We conclude with a brief examination of two alternative 
modes of inquiry, the pattern model and rhetorical analysis, 
that can be used to guard against the consensus and continuity 
inherent in the documentary model. The discussion of each al-
ternative method is selective in that the focus is only on issues 
relevant to subsequent discussion of empirical research. 
The next three sections focus on particular, contextual is-
sues raised by empirical research in relation to securities legis-
lation, the emergence of audits in the United States, and the 
effect of comparative world views on interpretation of research. 
Retrodictive analysis is used to examine securities legislation in 
order to show why the pre/post SEC dichotomy found in em-
pirical models appears problematic with respect to financial re-
porting. Some questions are outlined about interpretations of 
empirical results and we suggest areas for future research. The 
section concludes with a brief discussion of the rhetoric of rea-
son to highlight how the assumption of economic rationality 
structures empirical debate and to highlight questions that criti-
cal theorists might ask. 
Our discussion of the emergence of demand for audits fo-
cuses on belief transference, i.e., imposition of current beliefs 
on a prior period. We examine the reasonableness of the rela-
tionships (motivation and causality) implicit in the stewardship 
exists independent of human life and culture, instead truth, knowledge and 
morality are seen as rooted in social practices and tradition), see Arlington and 
Schweiker [1992] and Boland [1989], for labor value and process theory, see 
Lehman and Tinker [1987] and Hopper, et. al. [1987], for Foucauldian, see 
Hoskin and Macve [1986] and Miller and O'Leary [1987], for feminist theory, 
see Shearer and Arlington [1993]; see Tinker and Neimark [1988] for discussion 
of historical research from a critical perspective. 
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and information hypotheses to determine if belief transference 
has occurred. Then, we focus on one specific audit issue, detec-
tion of fraud, to explain why economic analyses of auditing may 
simply be too narrow to provide an adequate understanding of 
the demand for audit services. We conclude with a brief discus-
sion of critical research, related to auditing, to suggest areas for 
future historical research. 
In the next section, our focus is on the issue of method-
ological transference to assess how comparative world views 
impact interpretation of research results in behavioral account-
ing research. Ebbinghaus 's experimental simplification ap-
proach and Bartlett 's introspective approach [see Crowder, 
1976] are examined to address the issue. We conclude with dis-
cussion of the rhetoric of psychology to highlight why it is im-
portant for accounting behavioral researchers to be sensitive to 
historical context and the rhetorical metaphors they use when 
conducting their research. 
The concluding section begins with a summarization of 
why empirical research has not resulted in plausible stories and 
the alternative strategies that could be used for future empirical 
research. Implications of this paper for future historical inquir-
ies are discussed. Our message is simple—the accounting aca-
demic literature needs to celebrate diversity and keep conversa-
tions open if accounting researchers are going to respond ad-
equately to the challenges facing the discipline. A commitment 
to a specific criterial s tandard of knowledge, a scientific 
method, will not be sufficient to achieve this objective; instead, 
accounting researchers must make a commitment to scientific 
mores—tolerance, the free exchange of ideas, and accurate re-
porting of results. 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH 
The documentary model has gained almost paradigmatic 
status in historical research. The model emphasizes collection 
of data, "objectivity" of sources, and sequential [chronological] 
analysis. The focus is on identification of regularities that can 
be used to give coherence and continuity to a narrative account. 
In its extreme form, as outlined by Elton [1967], the historian 
becomes an archivist, a simple reporter of facts.6 This form of 
6See Megill and McCloskey [1989] who note that the extreme form of the 
documentary model suggests that a historical accounting is akin to a "lab report 
to be written up." 
5
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the model has been rejected by most historians for many years; 
it is considered an inadequate description of traditional ac-
counting history, although some accounting historians might 
disagree.7 Traditional accounting history, however, does imply 
acceptance of some aspects of the documentary model that 
critical accounting historians would (or should) reject. 
For example, the documentary model contains an implicit 
hierarchy with respect to sources, i.e., primary being more ob-
jective than secondary sources. Traditional historians accept 
this hierarchy. Since the hierarchy ignores the process by which 
documents may process or rework reality, the privileging of pri-
mary sources may mask the reconstructive and partisan use (to 
legitimize past actions or to close off unwanted prospective al-
ternatives) of historical evidence. Therefore, critical researchers 
reject this hierarchy for, as LaCapra [1985] points out, there is 
no reason to value the discovery of a new document over a 
critical rereading of an old document or the account of a non-
participant source. However, if one is trying to understand the 
actions and motivations of people from their perspective, then 
the primary/secondary dichotomy remains important [Potter, 
1973, Martin, 1977]. The traditional historian's non-problematic 
acceptance of the documentary model's focus on motive, a ra-
tionalistic discourse, also would seem to be a distinguishing fea-
ture between critical and traditional historians.8 
These two aspects (hierarchy of sources and motivation) of 
the documentary model appear to be integral and appropriate 
aspects of traditional accounting histories. However, the docu-
mentary model's emphasis on sequential analysis, which may be 
best described as a continuous time series model, creates a di-
rectional bias that Mandelbaum [1977] points out may be inap-
propriate for specialized histories, like economics and account-
ing, that deal with cultural artifacts. He argues that the model's 
7See Berlin [1966] and LaCapra [1985] for discussion of why historians have 
rejected the extreme form of this model. For an alternative view with respect to 
traditional accounting history, see Hopper and Armstrong [1991], for discussion 
of critical historiography, see Tinker and Neimark [1988]. 
8See Brown [1989] for discussion of the implicit rationality of the concept 
of motive; see Anderson [1989] for discussion of work of ethnomethodologists, 
who have found that people feel they should be "instructed by reason" so their 
retrospective reports of their actions are prepared as if they had been "in-
structed by rationality." The work being done by ethnomethodologists clearly 
has implications for assessment of "primary" sources. 
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focus on continuity and coherence makes it difficult for the 
historian to recognize discontinuities created by cultural impor-
tation, a frequent phenomenon in specialized histories.9 
Conversely, a sequential analysis that focuses on an event as 
the terminus of a process, may depict that event as a discontinu-
ity, when it is not. Carr [1961] describes a "critical" historical 
event (a discontinuity), as an event that significantly changes 
existing relationships. The pattern model, discussed below, 
checks the impulse to focus on regularities and provides guid-
ance for determining if an event is a critical event, warranting 
periodization. 
The Pattern Model 
Kaplan [1964] suggested the use of the pattern model for 
explanatory research in the social sciences. This model offers a 
research tool which enables researchers to deal with complex, 
interrelated phenomena. This model, like deductive models, 
constructs explanations; the difference is that the pattern model 
does so by relating an event to a set of other elements that 
together . . . constitute a unified system. Kaplan [1964, p. 33] 
defines objectivity as continuously examining evidence to fill in 
and extend the pattern as researchers obtain more knowledge. 
Complex events are made meaningful by identification of causal 
connections; the resultant explanation becomes part of the pat-
tern, but that pattern emerges only retrospectively. 
Retrodiction 
Porter [1981] combines sequential, analytic and hierarchi-
cal analyses to adapt the pattern model to historical inquiry. 
The historian uses sequential analysis to highlight regularities, 
but this analysis serves primarily as a heuristic for further in-
quiry. Continuity serves to make novelty intelligible. Porter 
[1981] uses the term retrodiction, selecting a point subsequent 
9Cultural importation occurs in accounting when an accounting technique, 
practice or theory is found in a nation, although it is inconsistent with the 
socioeconomic or cultural structure of the host country. The rather odd group-
ings that have surfaced in "cluster" analysis of accounting practices that suggest 
that the Mexican socioeconomic condition and culture is more like the United 
States, than is the United Kingdom's, perhaps best reflect the fact that cultural 
importation occurs; see Frank [1979]. Alternatively, these clusters may occur 
because the data being analyzed are misleading; see Nobes [1991]. 
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to an event and working back toward the event, to describe the 
analytic phase of historical inquiry. Retrodiction involves more 
than reverse sequential analysis in that the effects of an event 
emerge and gradually absorb its causal antecedents; the event 
and subsequent actions, give new meaning to evidence gathered 
in the sequential analysis [Porter, 1981]. 
For example, actions of any group may be symbolic, de-
signed to respond to external criticism without affecting real 
change. Whether an action was symbolic, however, cannot be 
known until the event unfolds and subsequent actions give 
meaning to evidence previously examined. Retrodiction also in-
creases awareness of any unintended consequences of an event 
and makes it easier to identify chance events in the antecedent 
period, both important factors in specialized histories. Porter 
[1981, p. 35] suggests that historians ask three questions to de-
termine the historical significance of an event, namely "what 
happened, what might have happened as well as what happened 
[or did not happen] after the event." Significance becomes a 
matter of "hindsight." The historian has to do more than look at 
"what was" since "what was not" may be of crucial explanatory 
importance. This paper's retrodictive analysis of securities legis-
lation focuses on Porter's last question—what did not happen— 
to address the question of whether passage of legislation war-
rants periodization with respect to financial reporting. 
Rhetorical Analysis 
Rhetorical analysis is a critical method in that it challenges 
the fundamental premise of economic rationality, which under-
pins all explanatory empirical research in accounting. Rhetori-
cal analysis explicitly rejects the possibility of "objective" evi-
dence, suggesting that historians remain aware of "the political 
involvement of all interpretation" [LaCapra, 1985, p . 37]. This 
paper examines the critical implications of this form of inquiry 
briefly in the concluding section of the discussion of disclosure 
legislation, but that analysis focuses on a more traditional prob-
lem—transference. 
Transference 
Rhetorical analysis has provided historians with a powerful 
tool to identify transference; this essay focuses on two types of 
transference—belief and methodological—relevant to empirical 
8
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research.10 Belief transference occurs when researchers impute 
current beliefs to people in different time periods or in different 
cultures. A related form of this type of transference occurs when 
researchers imply that current beliefs are totally different than 
past beliefs. Traditional historians have recognized the dangers 
of imposing current beliefs on the past and a rich body of litera-
ture exists with respect to this problem.11 The danger of trans-
ference increases exponentially when researchers use a theoreti-
cal framework to explain a particular historical phenomenon. 
The theoretical assumptions must reasonably reflect existing 
conditions in the particular time period or the theory will have 
little explanatory power [Kaplan, 1964]. The examination of 
agency theory explanations of emergence of demand for audits 
in this paper focuses on this issue. Transference also can occur 
in disciplinary or subdisciplinary debates. LaCapra [1985, p. 73] 
concludes that research might be blindest when "disciplinary or 
subdisciplinary boundaries and protocols of research become 
the foundation for a self-enclosed frame for reference that in-
duces the methodological scapegoating—the exclusion or reduc-
tion—of phenomena and perspectives that cannot be fully ad-
justed to it." In short, conversations should not be silenced by 
forcing all research into the same mold. The analysis of two 
comparative world views in behavioral accounting research fo-
cuses on one aspect of methodological transference, namely 
how the transference of protocols from one subdiscipline can 
lead to the type of blindness that LaCapra warns can occur. This 
leads to a lack of communication between the two schools due 
to rhetorical arguments that discount the methods used by the 
competing world views [Carlston, 1987]. 
10This paper does not discuss cultural transference, but that problem should 
be of concern to all accounting historians. See LaCapra [1985], who warns, that 
the term culture often is used in a generic sense of a group with a shared 
identity, i.e., the accounting profession, raising the very real danger that signifi-
cant differences within that culture will be suppressed by assuming that the elite 
is representative of the culture. 
11Berlin [1966] and Potter [1973] emphasize the dangers of being doctri-
naire, i.e., making facts fit a theory, while Hansen [1979], Novick [1988], and 
Porter [1981] focus primarily on positivists' claims that facts are neutral as a 
more dangerous form of transference since the researcher becomes the arbiter 
of reality imposing his or her own meaning on the facts. 
9
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DISCLOSURE LEGISLATION 
Ball and Foster [1982] examine several topics, related to 
corporate financial reporting, and discuss four validity issues 
[construct, internal, external, and statistical conclusion] that 
arise in these studies. They outline two models that empiricists 
might use to assess the impact of securities legislation. They 
could [1] attempt to model events leading to the formation of 
the SEC or [2] treat the SEC as an intrusive event in a static 
social order.12 To date, researchers have used the latter model. 
This enables them to assume that formation of the SEC is an 
appropriate operational proxy for the concept of disclosure 
regulation and that "regulation can be operationalized as a zero-
one variable switching in the early thirties" [Ball and Foster, 
1982: p. 185]. 
From a historical perspective, the central issue is, did pas-
sage of legislation constitute an intrusive event, warranting 
periodization? For the pre/post SEC dichotomy to be meaning-
ful in a financial reporting context, passage of the legislation 
should have changed pre SEC reporting relationships, i.e., man-
agement/auditor, management/stockholder, auditor/stockholder. 
Passage of legislation does not by itself constitute a critical 
event since as Edelman [1964] notes, legislation may be sym-
bolic, designed to still public outrage without effecting substan-
tive change. Merino and Neimark [1982] examined events lead-
ing to passage of securities legislation, concluding that the dis-
closure requirements of the legislation appeared to be designed 
to maintain the status quo, i.e., to restore confidence in the 
economic system, a conclusion consistent with symbolic regula-
tion. Flesher and Flesher [1986] provide additional historical 
support for the thesis that the 1933 Securities Act was designed 
to support the status quo. 
There are some excellent sequential accounts of the forma-
tion of the SEC, those studies identify a continuous pattern of 
demand for increased disclosure that culminated in the passage 
of regulation.13 A limited review of the historical record here 
12Ball and Foster [1982: p. 178] note that modeling the phenomena that led 
to the formation of the SEC would greatly increase the complexity of the analy-
sis. See Benston [1969] and Chow [1983] for examples of research that adopts 
the "static" model; see Merino, et. al. (1987) for criticism of that model. See 
Flesher and Flesher [1986] for discussion of events leading to the formation of 
the SEC. 
13See McGraw [1984], Parrish [1970], and Seligman [1982] for historical 
analyses of disclosure legislation from different perspectives. 
10
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does not duplicate these prior historical inquiries, it does, how-
ever, focus on actions in the period subsequent to passage of 
legislation to highlight why the pre/post dichotomy appears to 
be problematic. If that dichotomy does not hold, then both the 
construct validity (does the experimental design employed allow 
the researcher to test their theoretical variables) and the inter-
nal validity (has the group partitions/experimental groups al-
lowed for an anticipated effect to occur) of the intrusive model 
would be open to challenge since depiction of passage of legisla-
tion as a random event in a static social order would be inap-
propriate. If that is the case, then valid inferences cannot be 
drawn from the empirics generated by the model. The approach 
here in this paper examines implementation of the reporting 
objectives of the legislation to address Porter's last question— 
what happened or did not happen after passage of legislation? 
Implementation of Securities Legislation 
The stated objectives of the Securities Acts were to limit 
managerial power, to promulgate uniform reporting rules and 
to provide information that would be useful to investors for 
decision making. The crucial historical question—were the 
stated objectives implemented? A brief examination of the his-
torical record suggests that the answer is no. The SEC clearly 
did not promulgate uniform rules nor is there evidence manage-
rial power had been limited. By 1939, managers seemed to have 
more, not less, flexibility with respect to reporting practices.14 If 
Congressional intent had been to curb managerial power by re-
stricting accounting choices, then the legislation does not seem 
to have achieved that objective. 
The SEC indicated that the political intent of the 1934 Act 
was to "make available to the average investor honest and reli-
able information" for decision making [Kaplan and Reaugh, 
1939, p. 35]. However, if that was the case, then the failure of 
14Part of this can be attributed to the legal liability imposed on auditors by 
securities legislation, a brief review of the AIA/SEC literature shows that audi-
tors did not seek to limit management's choices. The SEC accepted consistency, 
which limited auditors' responsibilities, and conservatism, which Gilman [1939, 
p. 248] concludes gave management the right to tell stockholder untruths about 
their company, in lieu of uniformity. The SEC delegated authority for setting 
accounting standards with the issuance of ASR #4, April 25, 1938 and by 1939, 
the era of dirty surplus was in full bloom, see Previts and Merino [1979] for 
discussion of the flexibility afforded managers. 
11
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the legislators to require that corporations follow regulatory 
standards in preparing annual reports is curious. Kaplan and 
Reaugh [1939] point out that the SEC did not make filings eas-
ily accessible to "average" investors. SEC commissioners usually 
referred to annual reports when they spoke of investors' access 
to reliable data [Healy, 1938]. They certainly did not stress that 
annual reports need not meet SEC disclosure standards. Regula-
tors, like political reformers, may have assumed that the "aver-
age" investor could not benefit directly from financial data and 
would have to rely on financial intermediaries. However, plural-
istic democratic values may have precluded a direct statement 
to this effect so that the emphasis was placed on disclosure as a 
mechanism to create a "fair" game so that all could participate 
in the nation's economic growth [Merino and Neimark, 1982]. 
Kaplan and Reaugh [1939] compared pre/post SEC annual 
reports of companies that came under the SEC's jurisdiction. 
They found a slight improvement in quality, but concluded that 
overall annual reports did not contain sufficient disclosure to 
render them interpretable. Even disclosure of basic items, such 
as sales, did not improve significantly as 2 1 % of the 1939 corpo-
rate reports contained no sales data. In 1946, the SEC staff 
investigated annual reports of Over-The-Counter companies 
(OTC), cited numerous omissions, and concluded these reports 
did not provide reliable data to investors. The report harshly 
criticized audit firms for signing off on deficient reports that 
might mislead the public. Auditors were outraged. They did not 
dispute the SEC's findings with respect to the quality of OTC 
reports, but they accused the SEC of hypocrisy, since the same 
types of omissions existed in annual reports of companies under 
the SEC's jurisdiction [Editorial, Journal of Accountancy, August 
1946]. Maintaining the perception that investors could partici-
pate in a fair game seemed to be more important than the 
stated objective of actually providing reliable information to in-
vestors. 
Implications for Empirical Research 
The most fundamental question arises from the possibility 
that legislation was symbolic, an act of political manipulation, 
or as political persuasion, designed to change initial conditions 
and preferences. If the reporting provisions of the legislation 
were symbolic, then how do models that hold initial conditions 
and preferences constant, assess the effect of that regulation? 
12
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We suggest they cannot . In this case, the question is not 
whether disclosure was an efficient means to reach comparable 
objectives, but rather did it provide a mechanism to achieve a 
particular political objective. Nelson [1989] suggests that Riker's 
[1986] heresthetics (rhetoric by another name) political manipu-
lation model might provide some useful insights about the role 
of regulation. 
On a more basic level, how can the results of the current 
empirical models be interpreted if the assumptions of the mod-
els are questionable? First, if legislation did not result in signifi-
cant changes in financial reporting, what do the results gener-
ated by a zero-one switching variable model mean? The legisla-
tion would appear to be an intervening variable. The empirics 
would not test the impact of the legislation but some other un-
known factors. Similarly, what do empirical tests of pre/post 
SEC periods, based on a variable, such as sales, mean if that 
data was still not publicly available after passage of legislation? 
While the legislation did mandate sales disclosure, the SEC was 
not anxious to be embroiled in controversy so it adopted a per-
missive attitude and allowed numerous confidentiality excep-
tions with respect to disclosure of sales data in its filings.15 It 
seems likely that most of the companies that requested confi-
dentiality exceptions were non-disclosure companies in both the 
pre/post SEC period. Therefore, studies that use companies that 
did not disclose sales, prior to regulation, as an experimental 
group, assuming that they must have done so after passage of 
legislation, may be making an invalid assumption.16 If the ex-
perimental group contains companies not affected by regulation 
(non-disclosure companies), then the empirical results do not 
test the effect of securities regulation. 
Suggestions for Future Historical Research 
This essay focused on one issue, implementation of the ob-
15Accountants strongly supported confidentiality exceptions; see for ex-
ample, AIA Minutes [1936] where Wellington, Chairman of the AIA's Committee 
on Cooperation with the SEC, applauded the fact that the SEC had shown some 
leniency in allowing confidentiality exceptions; in the same year, the AIA issued 
a pamphlet urging that the SEC become even more liberal in allowing confiden-
tiality exceptions to income statement disclosures. 
16See Benston [1973] who uses companies that disclosed sales in 1929 as a 
control group and non-disclosure companies as an experimental group to test 
that efficiency of the legislation with respect to reduction of risk, i.e., variance 
of stock market prices of each group, in 1935. 
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jectives of legislation, there are other facets of "what did not 
happen" after passage of legislation that also need further ex-
amination. For example, New Deal reformers, like Berle [1933] 
and Douglas [1934], suggested that the 1933 Securities Act be 
viewed as no more than a "modest start." Both suggested that it 
would not be long before the government played a direct role in 
investment banking by passage of a federal incorporation law, 
which they viewed as salutary. 
Prior to enactment of the 1934 Act, there was almost uni-
versal agreement among reformers that disclosure regulation 
could not curb the power of those who controlled the nation's 
corporations or protect investors. What role, if any, did the ac-
counting practices, techniques, and discourses play in stemming 
demands for more direct government oversight? What changed 
reformers' attitudes, or did they change, with respect to the ad-
equacy of disclosure as a regulatory device? Empirical tests do 
not address the issue of what did not happen, but historical 
inquiry need not be so limited. 
From a critical perspective, a key question has to be, why 
should disclosure legislation be assessed on an efficiency basis? 
Brown [1989] discusses the "universalization of the economic," 
that makes all decisions, including ethical and political deci-
sions, subject to economic calculation. He argues that for this to 
be accomplished cultural barriers had to be broken down so 
that all ends would appear to be comparable. This is crucial so 
that all debate can be shifted to assessment of efficiency of vari-
ous means to achieve comparable ends. 
Tinker, et al. [1982] explain how this privileges a particular 
type of research. In short, if ends are comparable, then research 
that examines ends can be dismissed as subjective value judg-
ments of the researcher; whereas, evaluation of alternative 
means to assess the efficiency of obtaining comparable ends, 
results in objective, factual research. However, if disclosure was 
not viewed by reformers as a means to comparable ends, but 
rather a way to achieve a specific political objective (a non com-
parable end), such as restoring the "moral" legitimacy of the 
existing economic system, then empirical analyses that assess 
disclosure on an economic efficiency basis will not tell a com-
plete story.17 
17See Berle [1927] who concluded that the unbridled power exercised by 
bankers and corporate managers could result in "private property passing out of 
existence," he also lamented the fact that the courts refused to question account-
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Empirical models often may be too narrow to address com-
plex accounting issues, but that does not mean that empirical 
research has not raised some interesting questions for account-
ing historians. For example, Benston [1973, p. 218] found that 
companies that did not disclose sales in 1929 were "better in-
vestments" than those that did, concluding that disclosure com-
panies had "a greater real need to assure their stockholders of 
their worth than those who did not." The authors of this paper 
do not find Benston's [1973] results surprising, although we be-
lieve his conclusion as to why some companies voluntarily dis-
closed should be subject to closer scrutiny. Mattesich's [1976] 
suggestion that full disclosure entails a "doctrine of conceal-
ment" might provide an interesting starting point, as might 
Berle's [1927] contention that accounting practices enabled 
managers to gain absolute power. 
Critical researchers also have raised some interesting ques-
tions about disclosure. For example, Neu [1992] asks how was 
regulation expected to restore investor confidence? We doubt 
that empirical studies that assume that reformers sought to re-
store investor confidence by providing information that reduced 
risk, measured by the variance in stock market prices, accu-
rately capture political expectations; although that may be what 
reformers should have done had they been instructed by eco-
nomic rationality. Future accounting historical inquiries might 
examine the political or moral rationale for securities* legislation 
to address the question of political intent. 
Neu [1992, p. 366] offers one suggestion, namely, that fu-
ture researchers view regulation as a "textually mediated dis-
course" that structures social consciousness to create (political 
persuasion) the impression that perceived inequities have been 
corrected. Economists, who have recognized the multifaceted 
nature of regulation, also recognize, although in a narrower 
sense, the need to examine the political aspects of regulation. 
For example, Stigler [1971] suggests that academic researchers 
must try to determine when and why an industry (or a group 
ing practices, which he claimed is how people gained power; see also Berle 
[1928], who documents a series of cases that he deemed benefited bankers to 
the detriment of absentee owners, i.e., stockholders. If political leaders per-
ceived disclosure as the best means of persuading (political manipulation) the 
public that powerholders could be controlled and private property rights re-
stored, then the efficiency of that means becomes irrelevant since other ends are 
not viewed as comparable. 
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such as accountants) is able to use the state for its purposes or 
when and how it is singled out by the state to be used for alien 
purposes if they are to understand the regulatory process. Both 
traditional and critical historical analyses of the above issues 
would seem to be a necessary first step if accounting empirical 
researchers are to develop models that result in "plausible" sto-
ries about the impact of securities legislation. 
AUDITING AND AGENCY: SOME QUESTIONS 
Ball and Foster [1982] do an excellent job in outlining the 
methodological weaknesses of the "stewardship-contract moni-
toring paradigm." A similar historical analysis of the reason-
ableness of the relationships posited by the model would seem 
to be in order. If these relationships (motivation and causality) 
do not reasonably reflect actual relationships in a given time 
period, then transference has occurred. If this happens, a model 
has little explanatory power. While empiricists can credibly ar-
gue that the assumptions of a predictive model need not be 
realistic, that argument becomes tenuous when a model is used 
to explain a particular historical phenomenon.18 The following 
section briefly examines the stewardship and information hy-
potheses to highlight the types of questions that accounting his-
torians might ask about the reasonableness of agency theory 
explanations of the emergence of demands for audits. 
Stewardship Hypothesis 
In its simplest form, the stewardship hypothesis states that 
when a decision-making authority has been delegated to one 
group [agent/manager], agents have incentives to seek monitor-
ing agreements. They bargain with the principals to obtain such 
agreements.19 The incentives to bargain arise from the agents' 
fears that principals will overestimate the amount that they 
18See Kaplan [1964] for discussion of why explanation is not the obverse of 
prediction; while the term causality, consistently with the historical literature, it 
does not mean to imply that empirical correlations can determine causality, 
they can do no more than show association. It is the researcher that imputes 
causality to the empirical evidence. 
19See Dugger's [1983] discussion of how contracting (bargaining) replaces 
the invisible hand as the mechanism to justify laissez faire governmental policies; 
see Merino [1993] for discussion of why pragmatists, like Dewey, viewed con-
tracting as meaningless, stressing formal freedom over real freedom, and of 
little value to those who had no power. 
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might appropriate and penalize them unduly. Thus, benefits ex-
ceed costs and voluntary monitoring occurs.20 
This hypothesis imputes a specific motivation [to control 
the divergent self interest of principal and agent], infers a causal 
factor [separation of ownership and control that results in di-
vergent self interest of principal and agent], and a causal agent 
[management] to explain the emergence of a particular phe-
nomena, i.e., voluntary audits. If this hypothesis provides a 
valid explanation of why independent audits became widely 
used in the United States in the early decades of this century, 
then a historical inquiry should show that corporations, charac-
terized by separation of ownership and control and divergent 
self interests, were most likely to be audited. 
Unfortunately, most empirical studies use corporate size as 
the proxy variable for separation of ownership and control.21 
Trusts were the largest corporations in our nation at the turn of 
the century. Financial capitalists, like J. P. Morgan, who con-
trolled a large number of trusts, also were pioneers in the use of 
audits. If, as the brief overview of the historical record, below, 
suggests, trusts did not reflect the relationships posited by 
agency theorists, then the significant correlations found be-
tween size/audits should not be interpreted as providing support 
for the stewardship hypothesis. 
Historians generally have concluded that financial capital-
ists exercised absolute control over the trusts that they pro-
moted.22 Morgan [1913] made similar claims, stating that he 
controlled both managers and Boards of Directors [stockhold-
ers] of the companies that he organized, absolutely. If this testi-
mony and historians' conclusions are valid, then an autono-
mous managerial class did not exist in trusts. A nonexisting 
group cannot be a causal agent. Nor would the posited motiva-
tion appear applicable to trusts; if financial capitalists exercised 
absolute control over stockholders and managers, then it seems 
unlikely that they incurred audit costs to control divergent self 
20See Williamson [1981] for historical overview, see Wallace [1980] and 
DeAngelo [1981] for discussion of evolution of auditing from an economic per-
spective. 
21
 See Ball and Foster for discussion of the problem of size as a proxy vari-
able; see Demski [1988] and Kelly [1983] for interpretive problems created by 
use of size as a proxy variable in positive research. 
22See Edwards [1939], Galambos and Pratt [1988], and Fligstein [1990] for 
historical interpretations of corporate control in the Progressive Era. 
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interests. Alternative motivations for financial capitalists to in-
cur audit costs are discussed later in this section of the paper, 
after examining the information hypothesis, an alternative ex-
planation for the emergence of audits. 
Information Hypothesis 
In simplified terms, the information hypothesis assumes 
that separation of ownership and control [causal factor] created 
a demand for voluntary audits because investors [causal agents] 
needed reliable financial information to determine market val-
ues [motivation]. The hypotheses implicitly assume that [1] vol-
untary audits resulted in financial data of sufficient reliability to 
be used in decision making and, that [2] investors based invest-
ment decisions on intrinsic analysis. 
A brief review of the historical record suggests that ac-
counting historians might ask the following questions. Is it rea-
sonable to assume that audits necessarily improved the reliabil-
ity of financial statements? Or was Ripley [1927] correct when 
he charged that audits simply served to mask the continuing 
unreliability of financial statements? If his criticisms were not 
valid, why did accountants concede he made valid points? [May, 
1927, Wildman, 1928]. Were bankers correct in their assertions 
that Uniform Accounting [1917] so eroded audit standards that 
financial reports became increasingly unreliable throughout the 
1920s? [AIA, 1923, Campbell, 1928]. Why, if audits emerged in 
response to investors' needs for reliable information for decision 
making, did investors not demand that companies disclose the 
bases for valuation of various accounts so that they could inter-
pret data? [Merino and Neimark, 1982]. A host of other ques-
tions could be raised, but until the above issues are resolved, the 
information hypothesis should be regarded as conjectural. Thus, 
interpretation of empirical results must be problematic since 
the results support a number of alternative hypotheses, equally 
well. 
Alternative Incentives 
Merino and Neimark [1982] offered two alternative incen-
tives, one economic (to market watered stock) and one political 
(the desire to deter more draconic government regulation) that 
may have motivated financial capitalists, who controlled trusts, 
to incur audit costs during this period. The significant size/audit 
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correlations that empiricists report are consistent with both the 
watered stock and the political hypotheses. The alternative hy-
potheses have the added benefit of avoiding one of the inherent 
contradictions in the historical record, the growing use of au-
dits, purportedly for monitoring, accompanied by claims of the 
increasing unreliability of financial reports. Neither the need to 
market watered stock, nor the need to deter more draconic gov-
ernment intervention, required that audits result in more reli-
able information or that they be effective monitoring devices. 
One could argue that from a financial capitalist's perspective, 
ineffective audits were best as long as they created a perception 
that monitoring was taking place. Providing reliable informa-
tion probably was not a high priority for those marketing wa-
tered stock. Nor did audits have to have these attributes to meet 
political demands for symbolic reassurance. If accounting re-
searchers are to develop better empirical models, then a neces-
sary first step may be that those models reflect the actual at-
tributes of companies that were and were not audited at this 
time.23 
Future Historical Research 
From a traditional historical perspective, any explanatory 
study that is informed by a particular lens, such as agency 
theory, creates concerns about imputation of current beliefs on 
the past. The theories may offer partial explanations, but they 
may be too narrow to furnish adequate explanations. Future 
historians could make a valuable contribution to the under-
standing of the audit function if they examined the reasonable-
ness of "economizing" various types of audit functions. 
For example, the ongoing expectations gap may reflect the 
failure to recognize that cost/benefit is not the primary concern 
in many audit functions. The detection of fraud is used as an 
23For example, the Standard Oil Companies, among the largest in the nation 
and the most widley held, were not audited with two exceptions until the 1930s; 
but because they were traded in the unlisted department of the NYSE and the 
financial press had a separate section for quotations of their stock, these compa-
nies probably do not appear in most empirical samples. None of the Standard 
Oil Companies issued watered stock and most had an A common stock rating 
(perhaps a least cost monitoring device?); Rockefeller had little use for auditors 
and the companies he controlled had little trouble borrowing money or attract-
ing investors without audits; SOC companies did provide extensive financial 
data. 
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example to indicate when prescriptions generated by empiricists 
should be closely examined by historians, since those prescrip-
tions may be irrelevant. It is trivially easy for empiricists to 
show that it is not cost/beneficial (especially when the deterrent 
effect of audits is not measured) for auditors to detect fraud.24 
Accounting historians need to point out that cost/benefit analy-
sis is simply a statement of tradeoffs in values and that tradeoff 
may not be acceptable unless it can be shown that detection of 
fraud is an economizing decision. 
If, however, ethical concerns predominate, then reduction 
of detection of fraud to cost/benefit is inappropriate. One does 
not have to adopt a critical perspective to challenge the rel-
evance of cost/benefit in this case. Berle [1963] contended that 
fraud jeopardized the underlying rationale for private property, 
since there is no "moral" justification for allowing those in con-
trol to benefit by appropriating corporate resources that they do 
not own. Means are not the issue, ends are. Maximization of 
wealth is not comparable to maintaining the "moral" legitimacy 
of private property rights. 
Traditional histories could be particularly beneficial by 
pointing out the circumstances and conditions that lead to ac-
celeration of demands that auditors assume greater responsibil-
ity for detection of fraud. For example, merger movements 
could be perceived to strengthen managerial control; therefore, 
it would be useful to know if periods of rapid merger activity 
result in greater demands being placed upon auditors to be 
more vigilant in their efforts to detect managerial fraud. For 
over a century, auditors and the public have been at odds about 
issues such as detection of fraud, perhaps it is time to stop 
trying to educate the public as to the limitations of audits and 
take time to educate accountants as to the conditions that make 
political or ethical considerations of primary concern and eco-
nomic considerations secondary. 
There is a rich body of critical auditing research that should 
provide new insights for all accounting historians. This research 
has questioned the fundamental claims that auditors make to 
professional status [Hopwood, 1990, Willmott, 1991], ques-
tioned the value of audits [Humphrey and Mozier, 1990], and 
24See Watts [1980], who discusses Pareto optimality, but reduces detection 
of fraud to cost/benefit analysis, concluding it is not cost beneficial for auditors 
to be expected to detect fraud. 
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effectively challenged the depiction of auditors and accountants 
as "neutral" observers [Tinker, 1985, Hines, 1989]. Hooks [1992] 
shows that audit actions and behavior are consistent with sev-
eral social theories, raising a fundamental challenge to empiri-
cal research. Given that a critical mass of both empirical and 
critical work now exists, a comparative analysis of specific audit 
functions would seem to be useful, not only to broaden under-
standing of the current state of knowledge but also to assess the 
persuasiveness of the arguments offered from a historical per-
spective. 
COMPETING WORLD VIEWS AND 
BEHAVIORAL ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 
Ball and Foster [1982] outline six world views in financial 
reporting as a partial explanation of why empirical research has 
not generated plausible stories. D'Agostino's [1985] excellent 
analysis of comparative world views in historical linguistics pro-
vides an example of how historians might assess Ball and 
Foster's [1982] contention.25 However, to examine six views in 
this manner would entail another paper, since one would first 
have to determine if six world views exist, which is problematic, 
and then assess the impact of each. The concern here is to dem-
onstrate how methodological transference stops conversations 
in accounting by examining two world views within behavioral 
accounting. Both views are consistent with the basic functional-
ist paradigm of empirical research that has been discussed pre-
viously. 
Understanding the history of alternative methodologies 
(which may lead to dominant schools of thought) may enhance 
the communication and narrow the differences between com-
peting methodologies in accounting. Bazerman [1987] states 
that a research community will gain "confidence" in its pre-
scriptions and "stability of text" when researchers share a belief 
that there is "one right way" to acquire knowledge. However, 
this tends to silence creativity and alternative views. An under-
standing of the history of alternative methodologies may enable 
researchers to overcome a close minded view of knowledge ac-
quisition. 
25Paradigmatic analysis provides an alternative method of examining these 
world views, see Glautier [1984] and Wells [1976], but the two views discusses 
here appear to be within a functioning paradigm. 
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Historical methodology also stresses the importance of be-
ing sensitive to the surrounding environment. It is critical for all 
researchers, whether using archival data or doing a laboratory 
experiment, to take into account the conditioning environment 
that they are trying to understand and relate this environment 
to their assumptions, research questions, and research design. 
The researcher needs to ask: given the environment, do my 
assumptions, questions, and design make sense? In short, are 
they appropriate? The researcher must also evaluate the condi-
tions in which the findings will be upheld and under what con-
ditions will the findings not be upheld [Ijiri, 1972]. These ques-
tions are critical to current behavioral accounting research. For 
example, in cognitive psychology there are two schools of 
thought to the methodological approaches with respect to the 
study of human memory, the Ebbinghaus [1885] approach and 
the Bartlett [1932] approach. Ebbinghaus's methodology em-
phasizes internal validity, control and experimental simplifica-
tion; whereas Bartlett's method emphasizes the complexity of 
h u m a n memory, the need to examine human memory with 
complex material, and introspection.26 Both approaches have in-
fluenced behavioral accounting researchers (the latter repre-
sented by protocol analysis studies and the former by many 
laboratory controlled experiments). 
Accounting researchers have argued about the rigor and va-
lidity of two approaches; with most discounting the introspec-
tive approach. Nevertheless, observation of cognitive theories 
will show an integration of both methods in their models 
[Crowder, 1976]. By ignoring this integration, Hogarth [1991] 
suggests that accounting researchers are only concerned with 
replicating the cognitive experimental research in a sterile ac-
counting setting. These replications tell us that accountants are 
like or not like other individuals when it comes to decision bi-
ases. However, Hogarth [1991] avers that researchers need to go 
beyond the dominant schools of thought and integrate ideas 
from all schools, with a clear understanding of the specific con-
text of the research. This will allow researchers to address prob-
lems that are relevant to their discipline rather than do minor 
extensions of the psychology literature. The accounting litera-
26Introspection is a term that has been "disreputable" in behaviorism but has 
been allowed to come out of the "closet" under alternative metaphors such as 
"self-reports," "verbal" protocols, etc.; see Carlston, p. 150 for further elabora-
tion. 
22
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 20 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 12
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol20/iss2/12
Merino and Mayper: Accounting History and Empirical Research 259 
ture is at least beginning to consider the merits of a multiple 
approach [Gibbins and Jamal, forthcoming]. 
Another example is the criticism of the Lens model ap-
proach used in much behavioral accounting research. It is said 
the Lens model is dead in accounting since it represents a static 
model in designing experiments. However, Brunswik [1952] 
never intended the Lens model to be a static model. Brunswik 
emphasized the need to develop representative research designs. 
He explicitly states you cannot ignore the environment in which 
learning takes place. The Lens model itself should not be con-
sidered static, researchers just need to develop dynamic experi-
ments, using a representative design. For example, audit judg-
ment researchers may consider conducting field experiments; 
using the natural auditing environment and observing the type 
of information acquired rather than providing all the relevant 
information in a factorial design and sterile environment. 
Finally, accounting behavioral researchers (as well as psy-
chology researchers) tend to get mired and narrowed by their 
own rhetoric. Researchers limit experimental reports to con-
vincing reviewers and readers of their methodological compe-
tence rather than providing intellectual arguments to "persuade 
readers of the truth of an idea" [Bazerman, 1987, p. 140]. Re-
viewers concentrate on methodological weaknesses with little 
considerat ion for unders tanding and solving problems. As 
Bazerman [1987] points out, this may be due to the constraints 
on what is considered to be the "appropriate" experiment re-
porting style. Accounting behavioralists borrow from the under-
lying sub-areas of psychology. In doing so, they adopt the lan-
guage of the sub-area. Attribution studies consider "implicit per-
sonality theory" whereas cognitive studies talk about "schemas;" 
these terms essentially mean the same thing (how an individual 
represents another event or individual), but the two areas of 
psychology do not communicate with each other [Carlston, 
1987]. Specific metaphors are useful for those who understand 
the language, but they may also "obscure alternative interpreta-
tions" and lead readers to accept research findings without ad-
equate evidence [Carlston, 1987, p. 153]. 
Future Historical/Behavioral Research 
The above indicates that having an understanding of his-
torical methodology, which stresses the importance of sensitiv-
ity to the context, surrounding environment, and motivations 
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may be critical to developing more robust behavioral account-
ing models. Accounting historians and behavioralists can also 
join together and conduct studies which provide the historical 
back drop for alternative behavioral models, intent of the lan-
guage and metaphors used in the various sub-areas, and the 
intended boundaries and overlap of the competing schools of 
thought. Another important aspect of such an analysis would be 
to point out the critical need to validate the reasonableness of 
the assumptions underlying any experimental or empirical 
model. 
CONCLUSION 
This article attempted to show how historical inquiry might 
be used to assess the reasonableness of stories empiricists tell. 
The brief historical analysis of securities legislation was de-
signed to point out why the pre/post SEC dichotomy appears 
questionable. If the reporting objectives of the legislation were 
not implemented, then the legislation may have been symbolic. 
This not only raises questions about interpretation of the find-
ings of empirical models, but also about the adequacy of models 
that hold initial conditions and preferences constant. Riker's 
heresthetics (political manipulation) provides one possible alter-
native for future accounting empirical researchers working 
within the functionalist paradigm. Historical inquiries that ex-
amine the political and moral rationales for securities legisla-
tion might add valuable insights about disclosure legislation 
that would enable members of the accounting profession to bet-
ter understand the complex functions that accounting has in 
contemporary society. 
The examination of agency theory explanation of the emer-
gence of audits in the United States suggests that belief transfer-
ence (imposition of current beliefs on prior periods) has oc-
curred since the economic incentives posited by the model do 
not seem to fit actual relationships at the turn of the century. 
The empirical results appear uninterpretable since the most sig-
nificant correlations (size/audits) support alternative hypoth-
eses, exogenous to agency theory, equally well. Future account-
ing historical inquiries need to consider the possibility that po-
litical and moral incentives have created demands for audits. If 
accounting researchers continue to focus solely on the eco-
nomic aspects of auditing, then the expectations gap between 
the accounting profession and the public that has existed for 
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more than a century should be expected to continue. Perhaps it 
is t ime to try to educate accountants about the complex, inter-
active nature of the accounting discipline, rather than trying to 
educate the public about its limitations. 
This examination of behavioral accounting research shows 
that it relies on methodological transference from psychology. 
The dangers of this transference is that researchers will be: 1) 
insensitive to the changes in the underlying discipline; 2) insen-
sitive to the specific context and problems that are being exam-
ined; and 3) blinded by the rhetoric of the mother discipline, 
exhibiting intolerance for alternative interpretations and meth-
ods. Historical inquiries that highlight the contextual limitation 
of various world views may help accounting behavioralists to 
obtain a better understanding of the boundaries of their meth-
ods and the context of the problems they address. 
Future Historical Inquiries 
Traditional historical analyses serve a valuable function in 
that they enhance understanding of how the accounting disci-
pline has arrived at the current state of knowledge. By expand-
ing the parameters of analysis, historical inquiries can create 
discomfort and uncertainty about what are held to be "certified" 
truths. Questions, such as, under what conditions and circum-
stances is it appropriate to assume that promoting economic 
efficiency is the primary accounting/auditing function, when is 
it not, certainly deserve the attention of accounting historians. 
This paper suggests two areas, disclosure regulation and detec-
tion of fraud, where economic efficiency may be irrelevant be-
cause society may reject "economizing," i.e., reducing political 
and ethical objectives to economic decisions, as inappropriate. 
A rhetorical examination of how accounting discourses, prac-
tices, and techniques fit into the what Brown [1989] calls the 
universalization of the economic incentives simply may be fruit-
ful. 
Another question, related to empirical work, that was not 
addressed, but that needs to be addressed, is the relevance of 
the classificatory generalizations used in accounting research. 
Empiricists implicitly assume homogeneity of interests among 
groups, such as investors. Given the dynamic changes in the 
economic structure during this century, those classifications, 
which have not changed, may mask important conflicts that 
now need to be considered. For example, is it reasonable to 
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assume commonality of interests between current and potential 
investors or between "average" and institutional investors? Neu 
[1992] conducted a case study to show the differential impact 
that the bankruptcy of a company had on various investors in a 
new issue of that company. He concludes that accounting regu-
lations did not protect all investors equally well. Accountants 
need general historical inquiries that specifically look at the 
question of the adequacy of current classifications, and specific 
case studies that look at the impact of accounting techniques 
and practices on particular subunits within each user group. 
Accounting historians can make an important contribution by 
providing a more realistic picture of the current state of the 
discipline and by pointing out contradictions that exist between 
what academic researchers assume and actual economic rela-
tionships in contemporary society. This picture should consider 
both institutions and individuals. This may help empiricists to 
tell more plausible stories and behavioralists to experiment on 
more relevant problems. 
The message of this essay is simple—accounting academics 
need to celebrate diversity and keep conversations open. Critical 
historical research has provided important new insights by ren-
dering the familiar, strange; while traditional historical inquir-
ies render the familiar, intelligible. If accounting empirical re-
search has not been convincing because empirical researchers 
do not tell plausible stories, as Ball and Foster [1982] suggest, 
then accounting historical studies may provide a means of de-
veloping more robust models. To paraphrase Bronowski [1965], 
no research community can survive without trust and respect 
among its participants since all researchers are dependent to 
some degree on the work of those who have preceded them. 
Commitment to scientific values, rather than to a particular 
method or a particular theory, promotes creativity and novelty. 
As Bronowski [1965] astutely notes, what other disciplines can 
learn from the success of the scientific research community is 
not its techniques but its spirit—the irresistible need to explore. 
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